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Abstract. In open and heterogeneous environments offered by the In-
ternet, where agents are designed by different vendors, the development
of standards for agent communication needs to keep abreast of new dy-
namic interaction modalities. The objective of this paper is to contribute
to FIPA’s standardization effort by proposing a pragmatic approach to
the design of agent communication languages (ACLs) in which the mean-
ing of messages is the combination of its semantics and pragmatics. First,
we present a reformulation of FIPA’s communicative acts (ACL seman-
tics) using a grounded specification language which overcomes some of
the usual problems attributed to FIPA’s ACL semantics. Then the ACL
pragmatics aims to account for the contextual factors that enriches the
semantics, such agents’ roles, turn-taking, and the satisfiability of mes-
sages’ perlocutionary effects. We claim that the ACL pragmatics is best
specified by means of norms related to agents’ obligations, permissions
and rights.
Keywords. Agent Communication Languages, Normative Pragmatics,
Multi-Agent Systems.
1 Introduction
Enabling communication between heterogeneous agents a is crucial issue in the
developing of open environments. Ideally, languages for agent communication
should facilitate effective interaction without violating the autonomy and het-
erogeneity of the agents. This is particularly true in open environments, such
as electronic commerce applications based on the Internet, where agents are
designed by different constructors and work following their individual interests.
Most of the approaches to ACL semantics [1,2,3,4] are based on speech acts
theory [5]. According to this theory, linguistic communication is just a special
type of action that can be analyzed from three different points of view. An il-
locution is the central component of a communicative act and it corresponds to
what the act intends to achieve. The illocution should be distinguished from the
effect that the communicative action is meant to produce on the receiver (per-
locution), as well as from how the actual communication is physically carried out




(locution). Agents communicate sending speech acts (also called communicative
acts or performatives [1,2]).
Generally speaking, each speech act consists of a set of preconditions that
need to hold for an agent to perform the speech act, a propositional content, and
a set of perlocutionary effects (also called rational effects and post-conditions
[1,2]) that encodes the effect that the speech act causes in the receiver. FIPA
ACL [1] nowadays remains of the main efforts to standardization of ACLs. The
definition of the speech acts is based on a mentalistic approach, that is, speech
acts are defined in terms of agents’ mental states, and the definitions of mental
operators for beliefs, intentions, etc., are given in multimodal logics based on
possible world semantics (SL). The main criticism to mentalistic semantics is
that its specification language is defined using a multimodal logic which can-
not be related to a computational model and therefore, it does not facilitate its
pre-runtime verification. In relation to this, mental states in SL are not public,
meaning that they are not verifiable by looking at the history of agents’ be-
haviour [6,7,3]. Besides, some assumptions such as sincerity and co-operativity
are rather problematic to maintain in open environments [3,8].
An answer to FIPA’s shortcomings came by rethinking the general principles
in agent communication and taking a social approach as opposed to a mentalistic
one. From this point of view, performing a speech act produces a number of
social consequences, for example agents acquiring a commitment by sending a
particular message. Several authors put commitment as the core social notion
for the specification of speech acts [3,9,10,8]. The result was the specification of
public ACLs which, combined with the use of temporal logics [3], were a huge
step forward towards the verification of ACLs.
To abandon the mentalistic concepts of goal and intention in favour of the
notion of commitment means that the illocutionary aspect of communication is
missing [11]. A typical case is the request speech act, whose illocutionary point
consists of the sender having the goal or intending that the receiver execute a
certain task on its behalf. The perlocutionary effect would state that the result
of performing a request be the receiver executing the content of the speech act.
Note that from a goal-based approach to communication, the consequences of
the performance of a request affect the receiver which in this case has to either
accept it or reject it. However, if we are primarily focused on the social as-
pects, these intuitions are not very easy to express. For example, a request in a
commitment-based ACL would have as preconditions that “the sender commits
that the receiver has committed to accepting a request from him” [3], which
shows that agents’ intuitive motivations when performing a request are rather
odd. Furthermore, it is not easy to see how the social semantics would account
for the fulfilment of the perlocutionary effects of performing a speech act. Dealing
with autonomous agents, it is not possible to guarantee that the perlocutionary
effects are satisfied in the ACL semantics, because its fulfilment depends upon
the receiving agent.
As a matter of fact, we claim that trying to satisfy the perlocutionary effects
by means of semantic specifications is the wrong strategy. In fact, we go further
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and say that if in order to explain the social consequences of performing a speech
act, then the illocutionary aspect must be abandoned, we are going down the
wrong path. However, leaving the fulfilment of the perlocutionary effects up to
the receiver endanger the success of the communicative interchange. Therefore, a
key question remains to be answered: How can we reach an equilibrium between
(agents’) autonomy and (communicative) efficiency?
A possible answer is to look at the interaction protocols proposed to specify
and guide agents’ conversations. Interaction protocols are generally concerned
with the order in which speech acts are uttered. Thus, traditional approaches
to conversation in agent communication do not consider the speech context
(speaker, receiver, scenario, state of discourse, etc.) nor the content of the speech
acts to propose the protocols [1,12,13,14]. Furthermore they adopt a procedural
approach that reduces agent communication to an exchange of meaningless to-
kens [3].
Some authors [15,16] have argued in favour of a broader view of interac-
tion protocols. They distinguished interaction protocols (also called conversa-
tion specifications) from conversation policies. The later restrict the interaction
protocols based on contextual information (sender, receiver, roles, propositional
content, etc.) and not only in virtue of the order. However, these approaches
(notably [16]) do not give a formal and precise definition of the concepts they
use in the protocols and policies. Moreover, they do not account for the interac-
tion between the ACL semantics and pragmatics, which is necessary if we want
to explain how the perlocutionary effects are to be achieved. In fact, they claim
that the ACL pragmatics constitute an independent module from the semantics
[16].
As an alternative we propose to modify the conception of meaning in agent
communication. In particular, the view that meaning consists only on the speci-
fication of the ACL semantics and that the ACL pragmatics are simple protocols
which give the order in which speech acts are to be used. Instead, we consider
that the performance of an speech act in agent communication occurs always
under certain conversational circumstances, in which agents play specific roles,
respond to their own interests, etc, and that these issues should be taken into
account by a full-fledged ACL pragmatics. In this sense the meaning of a speech
act is the result of using it according to a set of rules of conversation. In this
approach, the social perspective is included in the ACL pragmatics.
An ACL pragmatics based on normative concepts offers a convenient solution
to the problems discussed above. Norms of conversation (protocols and policies)
may restrict the use of certain speech acts, facilitate the achievement of the per-
locutionary effects which are defined by the ACL semantics, provide mechanisms
of turn-taking and take into account contextual factors to do so. Conversation
norms are therefore dependent on the preconditions and perlocutionary effects
established by the ACL semantics.
This work aims to be a contribution to FIPA’s effort towards the standard-
ization of agent communication. Therefore, we include in our framework a refor-
mulation of some of the FIPA communicative acts in a speech acts library (SAL).
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We use motivational notions in the definitions of the speech acts to preserve the
illocutionary aspect of communication. A salient point of our approach is that
the motivational operators (goals and intentions) will be interpreted externally.
In other words, they will not refer to agents’ internal mental states. Moreover,
we include definitions for some categories absent in FIPA’s specification (com-
missives and declaratives). Both the ACL semantics and pragmatics are built
upon the same computational model. In this unified framework the pragmatic
component accounts for the social effects of performing a speech act and thereby
facilitating the achievement of its perlocutionary effects.
Next section introduces the motivations for an ACL normative pragmatics.
Section 3 provides an overview of the communicative framework. In section 4,
we introduce a specification language which is used in section 5 for the definition
of a set of speech acts. After the specification of the ACL semantics, we discuss
in section 6 two types of norms that structure conversation and we formalize the
main deontic concepts in section 7. We apply their semantics in the specification
of norms of conversation by means of automata using a declarative language.
We finish the paper discussing some conclusions and further work.
2 Normative Pragmatics: Motivation
There is a at least a precedent in agent communication literature with respect
to the view of meaning as the combination of the ACL semantics (speech acts)
and pragmatics. Singh [3] argued that
“What we usually refer to informally as meaning is a combination
of the semantics and the pragmatics. We will treat the semantics as the
part of the meaning that is relatively fixed and minimal. Pragmatics
is the component of meaning that is context-sensitive and depends on
both the application and the social structure within which is applied.
[. . . ] Pragmatic claims would be based on considerations such as the
Gricean maxims of manner, quality and quantity.”
Unfortunately, this paragraph does not refer to his completed work. Instead,
it seems to be pointing out a direction of development in agent communication
languages. This paper does assume that view of meaning and places it at the
core of our proposal. ACL semantics does not fully determine the meaning of
performing an speech act because the uttering and satisfiability of a speech act
may depend on contextual aspects such as authority or trust of agents involved
in the conversation. In this sense, we say that the ACL semantics is underde-
termined and that pragmatic rules are required to fully determine the meaning
of an speech act. Having an underdetermined semantics does not mean that the
semantics is ambiguous, it only means that the semantic specification cannot
take into account every possible scenario and linguistic interchange without loss
of generality, and without violating agents’ autonomy.
However, we will not follow Singh’s suggestion that Gricean work on im-
plicatures may be directly applicable to agent communication (see [17] for a
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preliminary Gricean approach to agent communication). Instead, we are more
inclined towards a development of normative pragmatics. The introduction dis-
cussed the problems of a semantic-based approach to agent communication and
how we may benefit from a more unified perspective where meaning is the com-
bination of both the semantic and pragmatic levels. However, we still have not
made an explicit point on the motivations in favour of a normative pragmatics.
In order to do so, let us assume that the semantic specification of an in-
form speech act states that when an agent i performs this act: (i) It believes its
propositional content φ, (ii) it has the goal that the receiver j will eventually
come to believe that φ holds, and (iii) the perlocution is that j comes eventu-
ally to believe that φ holds. The interpretation process would presumably be
described as follows: When agent j receives the message, it will assume that the
first two preconditions hold. As a consequence, j should believe that i believes
that φ, if j trusts the sender’s message, j will believe φ, which corresponds to the
communicative goal i wanted to achieve. Assuming that agents shall do all this
reasoning is, however, too idealistic. Moreover, it is computationally expensive
to let agents do all this reasoning. While text recognition may be an interesting
problem for computational linguistics, an agent communication language should
allow agents to communicate with each other effectively and efficiently in open
environments in order to achieve some goals.
The basic motivation to propose a normative pragmatics is based on the
hypothesis that the reasoning described above could be avoided if we establish
flexible norms of conversation (based on rights, obligations, permissions, etc.).
The norms of conversation would take into account those factors that influence
the satisfiability of perlocutionary effects (e.g., the receiver’s responses) and it
also may influence agents’ behaviour according to specific circumstances.
In relation to the latter, the FIPA CAL specification provides another good
example of why a normative pragmatics may be useful to regulate the use of
the speech acts. The specification of the agree communicative act contains a
pragmatic note that reads:
“The precondition on the action being agreed to can include the per-
locutionary effect of some other CA, such as an inform act. When the
recipient of the agreement (for example, a contract manager) wants the
agreed action to be performed, it should then bring about the precon-
dition by performing the necessary CA. This mechanism can be used to
ensure that the contractor defers performing the action until the man-
ager is ready for the action to be done”. [1, p.4]
There are a few other pragmatic remarks like this one throughout the FIPA
CAL that are not part of the semantic specification itself. These pragmatic re-
marks point out to the need of regulating agents’ use of speech acts, but the
FIPA specification does not go further. The fact that the designer felt compelled
to add such a note illustrates the valuable role that a normative pragmatics can
play. First, it states that agents play a specific role in the interaction. Second, it
constrains the behaviour of the agents in a specific context and even the timing
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of executing a particular action. Furthermore, norms of conversation for agent
conversation should combine nicely upon normative multi-agent systems, where
notions of violation and sanction, etc., are specified and – in the case of sanctions
– enforced. Thus, if an agent violates some agents’ rights by not following the
pragmatics, a sanction mechanism is in place, providing that exists an effective
relation to the general social structures and norms of the system.
Kagal and Finin [16] propose to use obligations and permissions to specify
conversation policies. However, there are a number of important differences to
what we are proposing: First, they do not provide a formalization for any of the
deontic operators they use. Second, they claim that policies are independent of
the ACL semantics, and that in fact policies should be specified in the general
structure of the system. We claim the opposite for reasons given below. Third,
the use of obligations produces policies that in our view are too restrictive for
autonomous agents. Four, they do not consider how their policies relate to an
general purpose ACL (such as FIPA ACL) for its use in open environments.
Finally, they use an ontology language based on OWL as the policy specification
language, but we believe that formal logic is a more suitable language to reason
about normative multi-agent systems.
There is an enormous amount of work done on the theory and practice of
normative multi-agent systems [18,19,20,21,22,23] traditionally related to spec-
ification of multi-agent systems using various types of deontic logic. Some of
these approaches include a communicative module that allows only a domain-
based interaction [19], while others have tried to build commitment-based ACLs
within an institutional framework [24]. As far as we know, it is a contribution of
this paper the specification and use of normative and organizational concepts to
design an all-purpose unified ACL framework for agent communication, where
the normative concepts are given a precise and formal definition. One of the ba-
sic concepts of our normative pragmatic approach is the notion of ‘right’. Note
that we are not trying to investigate what the nature of rights are, or how many
different types of rights can be distinguished or anything of the like (as discussed
by [20,22] among others). Instead, we give a formal definition of a notion of right
which is convenient for communicative purposes. Thus, the meaning of ‘right’
in our system is restricted to this definition. We do not aim to elucidate in this
paper the meaning of several deontic notions useful for the specification and rea-
soning about normative multi-agent systems, but to show how deontic notions
can be used for specifying ACLs relevant to normative multi-agent systems.
Summarizing, an ACL Normative Pragmatics (NPRAG) shall address the
effect that the following issues have on the sender’s choice of speech act and the
receiver’s interpretation of a message:
1. Context: Conversation policies state the relation between participants’ roles
and any particular contextual information (politeness, etc.) specific of the
scenario.
2. Perlocutionary effects: NPRAG specifies policies about agents’ commu-
nicative behaviour for a given speech act.
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3. Participants’ methods of turn-taking, constructing sequences of messages
across turns, and how conversation works in different conventional settings
are mainly dealt with the constitutive rules or protocols of the theory.
Regarding our interests in contribution to FIPA’s work on agent commu-
nication, we could have adapted the normative pragmatics with FIPA’s com-
municative acts library to offer a unified framework for agent communication.
However, we agree with most of the criticisms discussed in the introduction to-
wards FIPA’s mentalistic semantics. At the same time, we argued in favour of
preserving the illocutionary component in the ACL semantics. With this aim
in mind, we include in our ACL framework a grounded specification language
MLTLI for the ACL semantics where the motivational operators for goals and
intentions are interpreted from an external point of view. Moreover, the refor-
mulation of FIPA’s communicative acts using MLTLI result in a more simple
and natural representation.
3 ACL Framework
There are a number of properties that an ACL framework should comply with
if we want to develop a general purpose and efficient high-level communication
language for multi-agent systems. We have already discussed several that are
regularly mentioned in the literature. We echo the voices of authors such as
[3,25,26,27] among others to propose a number of requirements that are desirable
for ACLs to exhibit:
– Autonomous: Agent communication must endeavour in the development
of artificial languages for autonomous agents.
– Complete: The semantics must include a wide range of speech act types,
so that there are at least available those categories defined by Searle’s tax-
onomy.
– Contextual: The context of FIPA ACL is fixed with the sender. This im-
pedes to use the language in different contexts, which affects the heterogene-
ity of agents. Contextual factors such as agents’ roles, propositional content
of messages, etc., must be considered for the ACL to be applicable in a
variety of scenarios.
– Declarative: The semantics should state the meaning of the messages, and
not the order in which can be used. Guiding the use of ACLs should be done
contextually. Thus, it would be possible to adapt the ACL by constraining
the use of a subset in a specific context.
– Formal: ACL semantics and pragmatics must be formally defined. A clear
and explicit specification would facilitate interoperability for open multi-
agent systems.
– Grounded: The ACL presented should be grounded into a computational
model. This will allow to translate the properties of the agents of the system
into program properties. This also facilitates the verification of the ACL.
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– Public: Communication must be public. ACL semantics must not depend
on agents’ private mental states. Social consequences of performing speech
acts must be addressed by the ACL pragmatics.
– Perlocutionary: ACL pragmatics should aim to facilitate the achievement
of the perlocutionary effects.
The unified ACL consists of a set of speech acts, the Speech Acts Library
(SAL), and the ACL pragmatics consisting of norms that constrain agents’ be-
haviour. We also define two specification languages, MLTLI and NLTLI , to
define the semantics of the cognitive and normative concepts used in the ACL.
Besides, the two specification languages have a temporal component to take into
account the evolution of the system over time. In this paper, the ACL seman-
tics captures the illocutionary character of communication. The ACL pragmatics
contextually regulates the use of the speech to facilitate the achievement of the
perlocutionary effects. Thus, a unified ACL is defined as the tuple (we build on
[26]):
UACL = 〈SAL,MLTLI , NPRAG,NLTLI〉
Following FIPA CAL [1], messages of SAL are based on a STRIPS-like lan-
guage with preconditions and effects. On the one hand, the preconditions have
to be true for the agent to send a message (including the goal the sender intends
to achieve by sending that message). On the other hand, the effects state the
response that the sender wants to produce in the audience. This is a problematic
issue because, as it has been already discussed, autonomous agents, by defini-
tion, cannot be forced to guarantee the effects. The semantics of SAL are given
by a function
J−KSAL : wff (SAL)→ wff (MLTLI)
The syntax of the communication language SAL is based on the FIPA ACL
[1]. The semantics of the motivational and temporal operators is given byMLTLI
in the next section. The language MLTLI is based on Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) extended with operators for beliefs, goals and intentions. We combine the
cognitive notions with temporal operators a´ la Fagin et al. [28]. In doing so, we
aim to ground MLTLI upon a computational model, the first stage to facilitate
its verification [29].
In the interpretation for beliefs, goals and intentions proposed here, they are
ascribed to agents by an external reasoner about the system. Following the Inter-
preted Systems approach [28] for modelling knowledge, agents in our framework
do not compute their beliefs, goals and intentions, and as a consequence, the
ACL defined using MLTLI as the semantic specification language does not rely
on agents’ internal (mental) states.
NLTLI consists of linear temporal operators combined with a deontic oper-
ator for obligations. NLTLI provides the semantics for the normative operators
used in the specification of NPRAG. The conversation policies and interaction
protocols of NPRAG can be specified using a logic-based declarative language.
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4 MLTLI
Traditionally, the role of formal logic in artificial intelligence and distributed
computing is to provide clear formal tools to specify complex systems. However,
the logic-based specifications have been criticized on the grounds that they do
not provide real methodologies for building distributed systems. In order to cope
with the increasing complexity of the capabilities required by agents, researchers
have been using complex multimodal logics for their specification which are
generally ignored by programmers that do not see a clear relation between the
specifications in formal logic and computational systems [30,31].
Several authors [28,31] have argued that to bridge the gap between theory
and practice, the multimodal logics used in the specification of multi-agent sys-
tems must be grounded in a computational model. There are two main semantic
approaches to the formalization of agent systems via modal logics. The tra-
ditional model is based on the work of [32] on possible-world semantics. The
possible-world approach includes the theory of intention [33] and the BDI logic
of [34]. The problem with possible world semantics is that the accessibility rela-
tions used to define mental operators are not easily related to a computational
model. Appropriate grounded semantics ensures that a clear correspondence can
be found between states in the computing system and configurations in the log-
ical description (see [29] for a good discussion on these issues).
The second approach, the Interpreted Systems model, offers a natural inter-
pretation of the notion of knowledge in terms of states of agents in distributed
systems [28]. We adapt the interpreted system approach to our purposes of giving
a grounded and public semantics for beliefs, goals and intentions.
4.1 Syntax
The syntax of the language MLTLI (Motivational Linear Temporal Logic on
Interpreted Systems) associated to the interpreted system IS consists of the
usual vocabulary of interpreted systems IS and the accessibility relations for
beliefs, goals and intentions.MLTLI structures are the result of the combination
of IS with the accessibility relations Bi, Gi and Ii defined for the structure MI .
The following symbols and abbreviations will be used: = for definitions. To
start to construct a formal language, a set of atomic propositions (where each
proposition corresponds to a variable in the model) and the usual Boolean con-
nectives are introduced: negation ¬, disjunction ∨, conjunction ∧, conditional
→, and material equivalence ↔. Atomic formulae will be denoted by φ, φ0, φ1,
ψ . . .
The operatorsX, F , G, U are called the temporal operators. All the temporal
operators are interpreted relative to a current global state. There are many runs
(sequences of global states) of the system starting at the current state. The
temporal operators describe the ordering of events in time along a run and have
the following intuitive meaning:
– Fφ (reads “φ holds sometime in the future”) is true of run if there exists a
global state in the run where formula φ is true.
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– Gφ (reads “φ holds globally”) is true of a if φ is true at every global state
in the run.
– Xφ (reads “φ holds in the next state”) is true of a path if φ is true in the
state reached immediately after the current state in the run.
– φ Uψ (reads “φ holds until ψ holds”, is true of a run if ψ is true in some
state in the run, and φ holds in all preceding states. In other words, ψ does
eventually hold and that φ will hold everywhere until ψ holds.
Definition 1 (MLTLI Syntax).
The syntax of the semantic specification language MLTLI is given by the
following BNF expression (consider n agents):
φ := AP |¬φ|φ ∧ ψ|Biφ|Giφ|Iiφ|Xφ|Fφ|Gφ|φUψ
We use True and False as shorthands for φ ∨ ¬φ and ¬True respectively.
Although we have include in the syntax every temporal operator, we can define
X, F and G as abbreviations:
Xφ ≡ False U φ
Fφ ≡ True U φ
Gφ ≡ ¬F¬φ
The next operator X is true at some state s whenever φ is true at some future
point t and there are no other states between s and t. F holds if a formula is
true at some point in the future and G is true always in the future, that is, there
is not a future global state in which φ is not true.
We can conventionally establish several binding priorities for MLTLI con-
nectives. The unary connectives (¬, the temporal connectives G, F , X, and the
mental attitudes operators Bi, Gi and Ii) bind most tightly. Next in priority are
∧ and ∨, and finally → and U .
In this framework, “agent i believes φ” means that, “as far as agent beliefs
are concerned, the system could be at a point in which φ holds”. In other words,
beliefs refer to the runs of the system. The notion of belief used in this paper
does not require that the belief be true. Therefore, an agent holding a belief
does not automatically made true the content of the belief. This property is
central for open multi-agent systems, where agents have available incomplete
and modifiable information.
An “agent i has the goal of bringing about φ” means that, “with respect to
the agent’s goals, the system could be at a point where φ holds”. Goals can be
seen as facts φ at a global state that an agent wants to bring about. “An agent
i intending to bring about φ”, means that from the point of view of the agents’
intentions, there is a run in which i intends, along that run, to bring about φ.
To ascribe cognitive states from an external point of view we generate a
structure MI by associating an Interpreted System IS with a serial, transitive
and euclidean structure M , so that beliefs, goals and intentions refer to runs of
the multi-agent system. The fundamental notion in this approach is the one of
local state. If we look the system at any point in time, every agent is in some
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unique state. The only assumptions we need to make about local states is that
all the information that agents’ possess of the system is encoded in their local
state. Now, given that we are interested in having an ACL semantic specification
language which can be used to describe the unique state of a multi-agent system
at each point in time so we do not rely on the agents’ internal states to evaluate
and verify their communicative behaviour, we need not only to describe the
local state of the agents but also the rest of the multi-agent system, which is
called the environment. For example, when analyzing a system where agents
send messages along some communication channel, useful to keep a record or
history of the messages sent. Thus, when describing a multi-agent system as a
whole (agents and environment), we use the notion of global state. These ideas
are formalized in the following section where a semantics forMLTLI are defined.
4.2 Semantics
The key idea of interpreted systems is that agents are in some state at any point
in time. This state is the agent’s local state which consists of all the information
about other agents and about the environment to which agents have access (we
follow [28] in the definition of Interpreted System). Furthermore, we can also
think of the whole system as being in some state. In this sense, the notion of
environment refers to everything else in the system that is not an agent. Both
the agent’s local state and the environment’s state conform the global state of a
system.
Definition 2 (Global States).
A tuple (se, s1, . . . , sn) represents a global state in a multi-agent system where
se is the environment’s state and si is agent i’s local state, for i = 1, . . . , n.
A system evolves over time. Thus, a run is defined as a function from time
to global states which gives a complete description of what happens over time
in one possible execution of the system. Following this, a system consists of a
set of runs. A system is always at a global state at some point.
Definition 3 (Runs).
A run r over nonempty sets of global states GS is a sequence of global states
in GS that gives a complete description of an execution. A point consists of a
tuple (r,m) where r is a run and m is the time. If r(m) = (se, s1, . . . , sn) is the
global state at point (r,m), then we say that re(m) = se and ri(m) = si, for
i = 1, . . . , n.
A system can be seen as a Kripke structure with no labelling or interpretation
function to assign truth values to the atomic propositions.
Definition 4 (Interpreted System).
A system T over a set of global states GS is a set of runs over GS. An
interpreted system is a pair (T,L) where T is a system of runs over global states
and L is a labelling function for the atomic propositions AP over GS, which
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assigns truth values to the atomic propositions at the global states. For every
φ ∈ AP and g ∈ GS, L(g)(φ) ∈ {true, false}. A point is in the interpreted
system IS if r ∈ T . Formally, an interpreted system IS is defined by the tuple
(T,GS0, L).
We extend the interpreted system models with beliefs, goals and intentions.
Beliefs are given a standard KD45 axiomatization relative to each agent. For
goals and intentions, we assume a minimal KD axiomatization to ensure con-
sistency.
Definition 5 (MI structure).
Given a system of runs T , a structure MI is generated by associating the
interpreted system IS = (T,L) with the serial, transitive and euclidean Kripke
structures M = (S,Bi,Gi, Ii, L), such that MI = (GS,Bi,Gi, Ii, L) where:
– GS corresponds to the sets of global states in IS.
– L is a labelling function L : S → 2AP from global states to truth values,
where AP is a set of atomic propositions. This function assign truth values
to the primitive propositions AP at each global state in GS.
– Bi where i = (1, . . . , n) is a set of agents, gives the accessibility relation
on global states, which is serial, transitive and euclidean. Thus, we have
that (le, l1, . . . , ln) Bi (l′e, l′1, . . . , l′n) if l′i ∈ GSi. If g = (le, l1, . . . , ln), g′ =
(l′e, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n), and li Bi l′i, then we say that g and g′ are Bi-accessible to
agent i. The formula Biφ is defined to be true at g exactly if φ is true at all
the global states that are Bi-accessible from g.
– The accessibility relations for goals Gi and intentions Ii are defined in the
same manner.
The relations for goals and intentions are serial, so we simply adopt their
definition to say that the accessibility relations that characterized goals and
intentions between two global states, g Gi g′, and gIi g′ respectively, are serial.
Given that g = (se, s1, . . . , sn) is the global state, we say that ge = se and gi = si
for i = 1, . . . , n; this means that gi is the local state of agent i at a given time.
Agents’ beliefs, goals and intentions are defined with respect to their local states
and can be induced to relate points. For convenience, we will sometimes use this
simplified notation to refer to global states g.
We can now apply the definition of MI to define truth of a formula φ at a
global state r(m) of the interpreted system IS.
Definition 6 (Satisfaction in IS with respect to MI).
In this framework, to say that a formula φ is true at a global state r(m) in
an interpreted system IS if it is true in the related MI . Formally,
(IS, r,m) |= φ if (MI , s |= φ).
We would like to remark that the semantics of the accessibility relations
presented here relates global states and not points. We choose global states to
stress the intuitions behind interpreted systems IS. Moreover, it allows us to
give a natural definition to the time operators.
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Definition 7 (MLTLI semantics).
The semantics of MLTLI is inductively defined as follows:
(IS, r,m) |= φ iff L(r,m)(φ) = true
(IS, r,m) |= φ ∧ ψ iff (IS, r,m) |= φ and (IS, r,m) |= ψ
(IS, r,m) |= ¬φ iff it is not the case that (IS, r,m) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Biφ iff ∀(r′,m′) such that (r,m) Bi (r′,m′), then
(IS, r′,m′) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Gi(φ) iff for all (r′,m′) such that (r,m) Gi (r′,m′), then
(IS, r′,m′) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Ii(φ) iff for all (r′,m′) such that (r,m) Ii (r′m′), then
(IS, r′m′) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Xφ iff (IS, r,m+ 1) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Fφ iff for some time m′ ≥ m (IS, r,m′) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Gφ iff for all time m′ ≥ m (IS, r,m′) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= φUψ iff there is some time m′ ≥ m such that along the run such
that (IS, r,m′) |= ψ and for each m ≤ m′′ < m′ we have (IS, r,m′′) |= φ.
There are various issues worth to comment on the semantics ofMLTLI : L is
a labelling function on global states, that is, the truth of a primitive proposition φ
at a state g depends only on the global state g, since the global state encapsulates
all the system information at a particular point. However, there are situations,
such as “agent i receiving agent j’s message”, where its truth does not depend on
the whole global state, but only on the agents’ local state. On the other hand,
there are other statements which describe situations in which their truth depends
on more than the global state. An statement such as “at some point in the run,
the variable x is set to 5” (example from [28]) could be true at the global state
g, and false at the same global state of g at a different time. This problem is
solved by introducing the temporal operators, so we can easily express the idea
that something is to be true in the system at some later time, namely, Fφ. The
formula φ U ψ holds on a run if it is the case that φ holds continuously until ψ
holds. Moreover, φ U ψ actually requires that ψ holds in some future state.
In the interpretation for beliefs, goals and intentions proposed here, these
attitudes are ascribed to agents by an external reasoner about the system. In
this approach, agents do not compute their beliefs, goals and intentions in any
way, and as a consequence, the communication protocol defined using MLTLI
does not rely on agents’ private mental states. In the case of Giφ and Iiφ the
two points (r,m) and (r′,m′) are related if (r′m′) makes possible to achieve the
intention (respectively, the goal) of agent i at the point (r,m).
Agents in multi-agent systems are seen as runs. In the next section we will
show how MLTLI is used to externally ascribe beliefs, goals and intentions
in the definition of a set of speech acts. By combining cognitive and temporal
operators, we make statements about the evolution of the agents’ propositional
attitudes in the system. For example, we can say that agent i believes that φ
will eventually hold along a run: BiFφ.
It is also important to remark that the semantics ofMLTLI could have been
presented in a different way, closer to the possible world semantics models [32],
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that is, by defining the accessibility relations over points of the system [35,36].
The choice of global states stresses the intuitions related to multi-agent systems.
There has been quite a lot of work in the Computer Science community on
the theoretical aspects of temporal logic. In particular, the issues of decidability,
complexity and axiomatizability have been largely studied. We present in the
next section an axiomatization for MLTLI and discuss some issues on the com-
plexity of reasoning about beliefs, goals and intentions with linear time. Then,
we will put MLTLI into use by defining a complete set of Speech Acts.
4.3 Axiomatics
Multi-agent systems quite often operate without complete information about
their environment, which could include other agents. Thus, it is interesting to
use formalisms that allow us to talk of the system’s changes over time. The
axiomatics of MLTLI consists of the traditional KD45n for belief and KDn for
goals and intentions. i denotes a set of agents such that i = 1, . . . , n.
PC All instances of propositional tautologies.
MP If φ and φ→ ψ, then ψ.
NECb If φ, then Biφ.
NECg If φ, then Giφ.
NECi If φ, then Iiφ.




Kg Gi(φ→ ψ)→ (Giφ→ Giψ).
Dg Giφ→ ¬Gi¬φ.
Ki Ii(φ→ ψ)→ (Iiφ→ Iψ).
Di Iiφ→ ¬Ii¬φ.
The following axioms are known to provide a sound and complete axiomati-
zation for LTL [37].
PC All tautologies of propositional logic.
T1 X(φ→ ψ)→ (Xφ→ Xψ).
T2 X(¬φ) ≡ ¬Xφ.
T3 φ U ψ ≡ ψ ∨ (φ ∧X(φ U ψ).
RT1 From φ infer Xφ.
RT2 From φ′ → ¬ψ ∧Xφ′ infer φ′ → ¬(φ U ψ).
MP From φ and φ→ ψ infer ψ.
The axiomatic system is denoted by the expression (BKD45GKDIKD)LTL,
which is abbreviated by MLTLI −Ax.
Theorem 1. The system MLTLI − Ax is a sound and complete axiomatiza-
tion with respect to the class of models MLTLI that are serial, transitive and
euclidean.
Completeness can be shown following the technique used in [38], who gave a
sound and complete axiomatization for a logic with linear time and an operator
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for knowledge. Furthermore, [39] has very recently given a complete axiomati-
zation for deontic and epistemic operators with branching time. [34] also prove
completeness for BDI with branching time. The sketch of the proof is as follows:
We need to show that the logic complies with the finite-model property, hence it
is decidable. In order to do that, we define two structures, a Hintikka structure
for a given formula ϕ and the quotient structure for a given model. From here
we can prove that ϕ is satisfiable by constructing a Hintikka structure for ϕ and
we build a pseudomodel of MLTLI structures using its quotient structure. For
details, we refer to the reader to the papers cited above since the length of this
proof exceeds the purpose of this paper.
Our work is obviously related and influenced by the work done on linear
temporal logics [40] and the interpreted systems literature [28] about knowledge.
Most of the formal apparatus defined in this section will be inherited by the ACL
pragmatic specification language NLTLI . The main difference (if only) is that
the we combine a deontic operator with the linear time component defined here.
5 Speech Acts Library (SAL)
We had three main motivations to define a semantic specification language like
MLTLI :
– First, given that MLTLI is going to define the semantics of the speech acts,
this logic had to allow operators for beliefs, goals and intentions to express
the illocutionary character of communication.
– Second, MLTLI had to be grounded in a computational model, so it was
interesting to find an alternative to possible world semantics to include mo-
tivational attitudes in our language.
– Finally, the temporal logic component allows us to analyze how a system
evolves over time.
In this section we use MLTLI to propose a public and grounded semantics.
The ACL semantics consists of a Speech Acts Library which is defined using the
semantic specification language MLTLI . The main purpose of this semantics is
to show how the different validity claims can be understood in terms of our spec-
ification language, and formalized using the logic developed. The illocutionary
point of speech act are expressed in the Feasibility Preconditions (FPs). We also
specify Rational Effects to capture the perlocutionary effects that the sender
intends to produce on the receiver. However, note that to provide mechanisms
that allow agents to achieve the Rational Effects is a task to be performed by
the ACL pragmatics.
Unlike some other alternatives to FIPA ACL discussed in the introduction,
we view our Speech Acts Library as a contribution to the standardization effort
lead by the FIPA project. In this sense, the definition of a public and grounded
semantics aims to tackle the FIPA CAL shortcomings discussed. Furthermore,
in many cases the informal description of a speech act includes references such
as “at some point in the future”, “once the given precondition is true”, etc. We
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will see that those aspects of the specification can be naturally expressed in a
simpler way using MLTLI . With this point in mind, we not only define at least
one speech act or communicative act for each of the categories proposed by [5],
but also a version for several of the communicative acts defined in the FIPA ACL
is given (see [41] for a complete reformulation of every FIPA communicative act
using MLTLI).
Following [5], we classify speech acts into assertives, commissives, directives,
declarations and expressives. The last category is not relevant for the purposes
of this paper, so it will not be included (we are not considering affective agents).
The syntax of the speech acts is based on the FIPA ACL. Table 1 presents our
new definitions of four speech acts plus two more expressing commissives and
declaratives not present in FIPA’s specification.
〈i, inform(j, φ)〉 〈i, request(j, φ)〉
FP : Bi(φ) ∧Gi(Bj(φ)) FP : Gi(Ij(Fφ))
RE : Bjφ RE : Fφ
〈i, confirm(j, φ)〉 〈i, disconfirm(j, φ)〉
FP : Bi(φ) ∧Bi(BjFφ ∨BjF¬φ)) FP : Bi¬φ ∧Bi(Bjφ)
RE : Bjφ RE : Bj¬φ
〈i, agree(j, φ)〉 〈i, refuse(j, φ)〉
〈i, inform(j, (Iiφ U ψ))〉 〈i, inform(j,¬(Iiφ U ψ))〉
FP : Iiφ U ψ FP : ¬(Iiφ U ψ)
RE : Bj(Iiφ U ψ) RE : Bj(¬(Iiφ U ψ))
〈i, promise(j, φ)〉 〈i, declare(j, φ)〉
FP : IiFφ FP : Gi(Xφ)
RE : Fφ RE : Xφ
Table 1. A complete set of speech acts.
The two performatives at the top, inform and request, represent the assertives
and directives respectively. Agree and refuse are included as possible exchanges
after the reception of a request. Declare is an action of the declarative class and
promise is a commissive. These last two are our contribution to the FIPA CAL
specification. Therefore, adding promise and declare to the list of primitives acts
in our library (SAL) together with inform,request, confirm and disconfirm results
in the total number of speech acts of SAL to be twenty four [41], although it is
by no means a closed catalogue.
We use Searle’s taxonomy in the knowledge that there is little agreement
on the number of speech acts and types which should be covered, or whether
it is possible at all to provide a complete list of speech acts. In any case, this
partial list of actions cover the usual communicative requirements imposed on
agents. The eight speech acts provided in table 1 are representative enough of
to compare FIPA’s specification with respect to our own definitions.
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5.1 Assertives
Assertives perform statements about the real world. The typical assertive act
is inform. This type of actions do not intend to modify the behaviour of the
receiver, but only to affect its mental states. In particular, to modify the set
of beliefs the receiver holds about a proposition φ. The definition of inform
proposed by FIPA ACL indicates that the sending agent believes that some
proposition φ is true, intends that the receiving agent also believes that φ is
true, and does not already believe that the receiver has any knowledge of the
truth of φ. This is regarding the Feasibility Preconditions. The Rational Effect
consists of the receiver coming to believe φ. In FIPA’s formalization of this
communicative act the Feasibility Precondition consists of a conjunction: The
first conjunct states quite simply that agent i has to believe the proposition φ,
and the second one states that the sender believes that the receiver does not have
any knowledge of the truth of φ. This provided by the form ¬Bi(Bifjφ∨Uifjφ),
which it is decomposed as ¬Bi((Bjφ ∨Bj¬φ) ∨ (Ujφ ∨ Uj¬φ)).
It seems that this precondition is too restrictive on the sender, particularly
because in open environments agents may not have any information about other
agents’ knowledge. When someone asserts (inform) that φ, the sender usually
believes that φ and has the goal of affecting the receiver’s mental states so that
it comes to believe φ. Any specific constrains restricting agents to perform an
inform, until it is completely sure that the receiver does not know that φ, should
be formulated as a conversation policy. Therefore, we propose a new definition
of inform in table 2.
〈i, inform(j, φ)〉
FP : Bi(φ) ∧Gi(Bj(φ))
RE : Bjφ
Table 2. Inform.
The first part of the Feasibility Preconditions requires the sender to believe
φ which means that we want the sender to be sincere. This is a good assumption
by default, but if we want agents to be able to negotiate in competitive scenarios
this may be unrealistic. A feasible solution is to specify another speech act such
as convince that could be used when an agent just aims that other agent believes
a proposition φ, irrespective of their beliefs. This could give way to a trend of
defining communicative actions to be used in argumentation and negotiation
scenarios.
What about the Rational Effects? The FIPA specification says that whether
or not the receiver adopts the belief in the proposition φ will be a function of
the receiver’s trust in the sincerity and reliability of the sender. FIPA does not
provide a method to facilitate the achievement of the Rational Effects. Besides,
it is quite clear that the nature of this observation about the receiver’s trust in
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the sincerity of the sender, etc., points out to a number of factors that transcend
the ACL semantics. It seems that we may need to model, for a specific scenario,
the information relative to trust and other relations between the agents. This is
the role of pragmatics in natural language communication and in our view it it
is also the role that a pragmatic theory should play in agent communication.
Inform is the classic assertive speech act, but there are many others. For
example, answers are generally assertives. Thus, speech acts such as agree and
refuse are also assertives as are confirm and disconfirm.
According to [1], agree is a general-purpose agreement which answers a pre-
viously received request. When an agent agrees then it is informing the receiver
that it intends to comply with the request, but not until the given precondition
is true. Agree is not a primitive, so it is formalized in terms of an inform:
〈i, agree(j,< i, act >, φ) >≡
〈i, inform(j, IiDone(< i, act >, φ)) >
FP : Biα ∧ ¬Bi(Bifjα ∨ Uifjα)
RE : Bjα
The arguments of the agree performative consist of an action to be performed,
act, and the conditions of the agreement φ. The conditions are analyzed as in-
forming of the intention to do an action act under the condition φ. The condition
itself has to hold for the sender to agree with the request and to execute act.
This particular point is not very clear in the formalization. There seems to be
a mismatch between the informal description of the act and the actual formal
model. In any case, this type of construction is where MLTLI proves useful,
because we can naturally write Iiφ U ψ to express that the sender intends to
bring about φ until ψ along a run. More intuitively, if ψ is true, then Iiφ is is
true as long as ψ holds. The conditions of agreement are expressed in a more
natural way by using the temporal operator U (until), where ψ describes the
fact that constitutes the precondition of the agreement at a global state r(m).
The second conjunct in the Feasibility Preconditions of agree presents the same
form as in the inform act, so we will not repeat the point about the operators
for uncertainty, knowledge and the over-specification of agents’ behaviour in the
ACL semantics. The same goes for the Rational Effects.
Following the above discussion, the formalization of agree given in table 3
tries to capture the intuition that agent i agrees with agent j to bring about
some φ until some precondition ψ is true. This is equal to informing j that i has
the intention that φ will eventually hold in a run until ψ holds. The FPs state
that the sender has to intend that φ until ψ eventually holds along a run, and the
REs establish that the receiver believes that the sender possess that intention.
The dual of agree is refuse. Refuse is a negative answer to a request.
According to [1], refuse denotes the action of refusing to perform a given ac-
tion and explaining the reason for the refusal. The arguments of the performative
consist of the refused action and a proposition which provides an explanation for
the refusal. Moreover, refuse is an abbreviation of disconfirm: an act is possible
for the agent to be performed (and providing an explanation). An agent consid-
ers that is not possible to perform an action when the action preconditions are
Norms and Conversation in Agent Communication 19
〈i, agree(j, φ)〉 ≡
〈i, inform(j, (Iiφ U ψ))〉
FP : Iiφ U ψ
RE : Bj(Iiφ U ψ)
Table 3. Agree.
not satisfied. As an example, an agent may be requested to perform an action for
which it has insufficient privilege (hence the explanation: I have not got enough
privileges).
The definition of refuse given by FIPA is as follows:
〈i, refuse(j,< i, act >, φ)〉 ≡
〈i, disconfirm(j, Feasible(< i, act >))〉;
〈i, inform(j, φ ∧ ¬Done(< i, act >) ∧ ¬IiDone(< i, act >))〉
FP : Bi¬Feasible(< i, act >) ∧Bi(BjFeasible(< i, act >)∨
UjFeasible(< i, act >))Biα ∧ ¬Bi(Bifjα ∨ Uifjα)
RE : Bj¬Feasible(< i, act >) ∧Bjα
It is surprising that being agree and refuse the dual of each other their
logical form does not show any similarities whatsoever. Moreover, the use of
operators such as Feasible to provide reasons for refusing to do an action greatly
complicates the complexity and decidability of the logic, as it is shown by the
extremely complex definition of refuse given above.
Conversely, refuse is to be analyzed as the dual of agree. Following FIPA’s
recommendation, it is decomposed in terms of the inform primitive to commu-
nicate that the receiver of the request does not intend to bring about some φ
(the object of the request) until ψ (the precondition of the agreement/refusal).
Its definition is given by table 4.
〈i, refuse(j, φ)〉 ≡
〈i, inform(j,¬(Iiφ U ψ))〉
FP : ¬(Iiφ U ψ)
RE : Bj(¬(Iiφ U ψ))
Table 4. Refuse.
Formally, the precondition to send a refuse states that sender does not intend,
along a run, to eventually bring about φ until ψ; the Rational Effects aims that
the receiver believes that the sender does not intend to eventually bring about
φ along a run (i.e., to fulfil the request) until ψ. Again, the use of temporal
operators greatly simplifies the speech act definitions.
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Table 1 provides a definition for two more speech acts: confirm and discon-
firm. The above discussion with respect to agree, refuse and inform also applies
to confirm and disconfirm.
In our view, the FIPA semantics are given by means of a multimodal logic
with dynamic and cognitive operators (Uncertain, Feasible, Done, etc.) that
greatly increases the complexity of the logic and of the speech act itself. In this
sense, MLTLI greatly simplifies the speech acts definitions by using temporal
operators that describe the states of the system.
With respect to the social semantics approaches, Singh [3] proposes that an
inform means that objectively, “the sender commits that the content is true”,
and practically, “the sender commits that it has a reason to know the con-
tent”. Singh’s aim is to use commitments to make the ACL semantics public,
but in doing so the idea that the sender has the specific goal that the receiver
adopts a belief is missing. Another way of saying this is that the illocutionary
aspect of the speech act which we defined as “what the speech act is intended
to achieve” is lost. The analysis proposed by [10] follows similar lines to Singh,
but the semantics of speech acts are not longer declarative, but they are given
operationally.
5.2 Directives
The FIPA specification of the primitive request consists of a sender requesting
the receiver to perform some action which can also be another speech act. The
argument of the performative is the action that the receiver has to perform. It
seems natural to think that one precondition would be that the receiver has the
goal of achieving something for the sender. However, this basic aspect is not
present in the FIPA definition.
We have already made the point about the complexity of the mentalistic
formalizations so we will focus on the social-based proposals: Singh [3] defines
request to objectively mean that “the sender commits that the receiver will
commit to making it true” and practically that “the sender commits that the
receiver has committed to accepting a request from him”. Giving this meaning
to a request means that the motivation to send a request is not clear anymore.
The motivation that the sender intends to achieve a communicative goal by
means of receiver agreeing to perform the action requested cannot be expressed
without using motivational operators such as goals and intentions. In this sense,
the use of pre-commitments [10] to analyze requests fails, in our view, to express
that the sender explicitly expresses its interest of having the receiver executing a
particular action. In this approach, a request is the execution of a public method
which creates an empty slot that has to be filled in.
Note, however, that we have not defined actions in MLTLI . Instead, the
labelling function is over atomic propositions φ which describe the state of affairs
of the system at a global state r(m). However, this reflects a simple interpretation
of goals: when a request is made, the goal of the sender is for the system to reach
a particular state of affairs, which in our case, means that we request that some
proposition φ is true at some global state r(m) of the multi-agent system. This
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interpretation in terms of the proposition that the sender wants the receiver to
achieve fits well with the intuitions about requests. This is also very similar to
the intuitive meaning of goals in [42].
In this paper, when sending a request, the sender holds the goal of the receiver
achieving a particular proposition φ, that is, of making true φ at some global
state r(m). Moreover, since we want the receiver to really try to achieve φ
the preconditions also require that the receiver intends along a run that φ be
eventually true. Finally, the rational effect to be achieved is that there is a run






Surprisingly, FIPA does not include any commissive speech acts. The traditional
example of a commitment is promise. The sender expresses the commitment
to perform the action expressed in the content of the commissive. Commissives
commit the sender to perform the action uttered by the message. That is, by
performing a promise, the sender states its intention to bring about some φ at
some point in the system. In our approach agents promise to make eventually
true some φ along a run. When sending a promise the sender must hold the
intention of making φ true. The Rational Effects must be that φ is made true at






Declaratives are not part of the FIPA CAL either. Declarations have immedi-
ate effects in an extra-linguistic institution. They are the original performative
verbs [43]. Declarations are particularly useful for institutional actions [24]. For
example, speech acts to start or terminate an interaction (conversation) are
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declaratives. In that kind of situations, it is necessary to identify which agents
are allowed to perform a specific declaration. Usually, agents have the right or
the permission to perform a communicative act depending on their role in the
particular scenario. In an auction, for instance, the auctioneer has the right to
declare the beginning of an auction. An agent wishing to participate should be
given the permission (by the auctioneer) to do so. An agent may perform an ac-
tion for which it has not the right to. Again, all these points are to be included
in the pragmatic component of the ACL to be presented in the next sections.
In the meantime we content ourselves with defining that when an agent declares
that φ, it has the goal to make φ true in the next step of the run. The perlocution
states that φ holds at the next step of the run. Note the use of the temporal





Note that the ACL semantics proposed has solved some of the problems
summarized in Table 8. The crucial point is that MLTLI offers a grounded











Table 8. Requirements for ACL semantics.
The rest of the requirements state that the semantics provided by SAL re-
spects the autonomy of agents, it defines a complete set of speech acts, it provides
a declarative and formal meaning. The requirements left, that the ACL takes
into account contextual factors and facilitates the achievement of the perlocu-
tionary effects are not meet by the ACL semantics. It is the pragmatics of the
language that account for the social consequences of performing an speech act
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by enriching speech acts minimal meaning according to the context, scenario,
agents’ roles, etc.
6 Constitutive and Regulative Norms
We have argued (see 2) many of the interaction protocol approaches developed
so far provide a low-level procedural characterization of interactions, or are not
expressive enough to take into account the contextual factors affecting commu-
nication. Still, interaction protocols are efficient using institutional contexts to
model turn-taking strategies. Interaction protocols establish which sequence of
messages is appropriate in each scenario. For example, in auctions, turn-taking
might underlie the specific rules to ensure that they are created only when they
make sense, e.g., a bidder should not make a bid prior to the advertisement.
In our approach, institutional interactions created by a FIPA interaction pro-
tocol such as an English Auction can be seen as the constitutive rules according
to which communication takes place. Constitutive rules only establish the al-
lowed moves within conversation. However, interaction protocols do not regulate
or constrain the use of the speech acts according to their content and context.
In order to do so, we need regulative rules that specify agents’ rights, obligations
and permissions for specific conversational contexts. This distinction between
constitutive and regulative rules in communication is due to [5].
“Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behaviour. For
example, the rules of polite table behaviour regulate eating, but eating
exists independently of these rules. Some rules, on the other hand, do
not merely regulate an antecedently existing activity called playing chess;
they, as it were, create the possibility of or define the activity.[. . . ] The
institutions of marriage, money, and promising are like the institutions
of baseball and chess in that they are systems of such constitutive rules
or conventions” [5, p.131]
In our approach, institutional speech acts are those whose meaning depend
on the institution in which they are used. Normative interaction protocols cor-
respond to the constitutive rules of conversations in terms of agents’ rights, obli-
gations and permissions. Additionally, regulative rules in agent communication
deal with context-dependent aspects: Level of trust between agents, roles, con-
tent of messages and other particularities brought about the agents involved in
the exchange. For example, a politeness rule can be specified that states agents’
obligation to send a response to a request. In our framework, regulative rules are
expressed by normative conversation policies that facilitate the achievement of
the perlocutionary effects. Conversation policies can also affect the meaning of
speech acts in institutions because the object of the rule can refer to an institu-
tional fact. Note that the distinction between interaction protocols and policies
is not new, although their relation to constitutive and regulative rules is not
explicit in other approaches [9,15].
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In the next section we present the pragmatic specification language NLTLI
(Normative Linear Temporal Logic on Interpreted Systems). NLTLI is defined
following the same methodology used for MLTLI but instead of containing
cognitive operators it includes a deontic operator. Once the syntax, semantics
and axiomatics of NLTLI are presented, we define the notions of violation, right
and sanction, which are also to be used in the development of the interaction
protocols and conversation policies.
7 NLTLI
The normative temporal logic NLTLI follows the general structure of MLTLI .
The main difference is that while MLTLI was designed to express agents in-
formational and deliberative states, NLTLI includes linear temporal logic com-
bined with a deontic operator. NLTLI structures NI are also defined by asso-
ciating structures which contain deontic accessibility relations to an interpreted
system IS. The definitions of run, global state, point, and the syntax of the
temporal operators defined in section 4 remain the same.
The main difference of NLTLI with other the deontic logics defined to model
normative multi-agent systems [18,22,44,45,21] is the fact that their semantics
are based on possible worlds. Furthermore, some of these logics are highly com-
plex due to the combination of deontic, dynamic and temporal operators.
However, there is a recent approach to deontic logic which offers a grounded
semantics [30]. They define Deontic Interpreted Systems as consisting of a static
interpreted system of global states of two different types: those that are allowed
and those that are disallowed states of the computation. The interpreted system
presented by Lomuscio and Sergot [30] is static in the sense that they do not
include the notion of run which provides the temporal component in standard
interpreted systems [28]. In a more recent work [39], a branching temporal com-
ponent and two epistemic modalities are added into Deontic Interpreted Systems.
NLTLI differs from the Deontic Interpreted Systems in various ways. First, we
define NLTLI with respect to a interpreted system adapted to model agent
communication. Second, the global states of the system are not required to be
exclusively deontic. For example, we assume that information about the history
of conversation, social structure, institutional facts, etc., could be encoded in the
environment’s state, whereas the obligations, rights, etc. of agents are to be kept
in agents’ local states. Third, we include a linear time component in our logic to
capture the evolution of the system over time. Linear temporal logic makes the
speech act specification simpler than if we were quantifying over runs. Before
we present the syntax and semantics of NLTLI a few remarks on the kind of
normative notions that we are interested in is offered in the next section.
7.1 Rights in Agent Communication
The central notion in the specification of norms of conversation is the concept of
right. Rights give agents enough freedom, but also constrain agents’ behaviour.
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Intuitively, there is a middle ground between traditional obligations and permis-
sions as defined in standard deontic logic [46], and the concept of right seems to
be appropriate to capture that middle ground. Other definitions of right in the
agents literature largely depend on the logic used.
Norman et al. [22] use dynamic logic to formalize a notion of right (which
resemble traditional permissions) to model agreements. Alonso [44] claims that
economic-based theories of rational choice, such as game theory, cannot provide a
satisfactory explanation of co-operation and collective action. The reason is that
in game theory, agents calculate individually their best choice. Communication
does not help either, because agents do not trust each other, and will not respect
any commitments. Games with multiple equilibria or with no equilibria at all
also pose problems. In particular, it is not possible to reach a rational decision
about the agreements agents should make. To solve this, either ad hoc solutions
or local points are proposed. Boella and van der Torre [47] describe rights as sets
of strategies of agents’ roles. Their proposal is interesting because they argue
that rights are exercised by roles, but in our view it is not clear how their idea
of right is different from the set of choices that agents have available, or the set
of permissions that can be specified for a specific role.
This paper does not intend to account for any possible ambiguity found in
the concept of right, namely, about the fact that right is used to refer to many
different things, such as having the right to live, the right to work, a right to feel
proud, a right to make pre-emptive attacks, a right to vote, etc. In this sense,
rights can be classified as liberties, privileges, claims, power, etc (see [20] for
a detailed discussion on these issues). Instead, we are interested in a notion of
right useful to a normative approach to agent communication. These interests
are based on the assumption that there is a middle ground between obligations
and permissions which allows coordination through communication between au-
tonomous agents. This idea is in some sense close to what Castelfranchi [48] calls
strong permission. A general idea of right we are interested in is provided by the
following characterization [49, p.1]:
“Rights dominate most modern understandings of what actions are
proper and which institutions are just. Rights structure the forms of
our governments, the contents of our laws, and the shape of morality as
we perceive it. To accept a set of rights is to approve a distribution of
freedom and authority, and so to endorse a certain view of what may,
must, and must not be done.”
An interesting point in the etymological meaning of ‘right’ comes from what
is fair or just. This sense is used when we say that a society is “rightly ordered”.
When applied to individuals, rights entitle their holders to some freedom. For
example, an agent can be entitled with the freedom to act in certain ways. In
our approach, rights are not merely seen as the absence of obligations.
If an agent has the right to perform a speech act, then:
– It is permitted to perform it (under certain obligations), since it does not
constitute a violation.
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– The rest of the agents are not allowed to perform any action that violates a
right-holder’s action, otherwise, they are sanctioned.
– The normative system, the group, which is represented by a special type of
agent, has the obligation to sanction any violation (we follow Torre et al.
[45] on this particular point).
The function of norms in agent communication is to stabilize social inter-
actions by making the behaviour of agents predictable to other agents of the
system. Permissions are defined as the dual of obligation. Having the right to
perform an speech act means that an agent must be given permission to do
so and that performing that action does not constitute a violation. Not being
obliged not to bring about φ (¬O¬φ) does not mean that the agent has the right
to bring about φ (Rφ).
The description of agent’s rights and obligations can be stored and accessed
by every agent at any time, so that the ACL pragmatics is public. An agent may
not know whether another agent is sincere, but it can know which rights and
obligations the other agent should abide to.
Using NLTLI allows us to model the evolution of agents’ obligations and
rights as system changes. The need of including some sort of temporality when
modelling normative systems has also been defended by other authors [18,45].
7.2 NLTLI Syntax
We need to express obligations and rights within an organizational structure
in which agents have roles assigned. Rights, Violation and Sanction are not
defined as primitives. The only deontic primitive operator of our framework is
obligation, denoted by Oi. Following the definition of the cognitive operators in
the previous chapter, we will accommodate the interpretation of the primitive
deontic operator for its use with respect to runs in an interpreted system.
Regarding, roles, we use the following notation:
– i rr j, means that i and j are role-related by rr.
– i is a member of group c, is expressed by ci.
– ri denotes that i plays the role r.
A role is a set of constraints that should be satisfied when an agent plays that
role. For example, the role of auctioneer constrains the obligations, permissions
and rights of the agent that plays that role. The scope of the role depends on
the institutional reality in which it is defined (e.g., auction). A group is a set
of agents (roles) that share a specific feature (i.e., being auctioneers). Finally,
role relations constrain the relations between roles (e.g., the auctioneer-bidder
relation).
The syntax of NLTLI consists of the vocabulary of the interpreted sys-
tem IS extended with temporal operators and the deontic accessibility relation.
NLTLI structures (NI) are actually the result of the combination of IS with
an accessibility relation Oi of a Kripke structure M .
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Definition 8 (NLTLI Syntax).
Given a finite set of agents i = (1, . . . , n), a finite set of group names CN ,
a finite set RN of role names, a finite set RR of role relations, and a countable
set AP of primitive propositions, the syntax is defined as follows:
ϕ := AP |¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ψ|Oiϕ|Fϕ|Gϕ|Xϕ|ϕUψ
Regarding the deontic operator Oiφ, its traditional reading is something like
“agent i is obliged to bring about φ”, or maybe “agent i ought to bring about
φ”. It is also interesting the interpretation proposed in the Deontic Interpreted
Systems (DIS) framework [30]; they define a modality Oiφ to express that “if
agent i is functioning correctly, then φ holds”. Following this, and considering
the fact that our system has time built in, the deontic operator for obligation Oiφ
defined in NLTLI means that “the system is at a point in which φ holds if agent
i works (acts) correctly”, which shares the same spirit that the interpretation
used for for the cognitive concepts defined in MLTLI .
As usual, Piφ is the dual of Oiφ such that
Piφ = ¬Oi¬φ
Which we could gloss as “the system could be at a point in which ¬φ holds
if agent i is not working (acting) correctly”.
7.3 NLTLI Semantics
NLTLI structures are generated by grounding a deontic Kripke structure M
into the interpreted system IS. .
Definition 9 (Deontic Structure).
A Deontic structure M = (S,Oi, . . . ,On, L) is serial if for any accessibility
relation Oi we have that for all s there is a t such that (s, t) ∈ Oi.
From the Deontic structureM and IS we generate NI structures for NLTLI :
Definition 10 (NI structure).
Given a system of runs T , a structure NI is generated by associating the
interpreted system IS = (T,L) with the serial Kripke structure M = (S,Oi, L),
such that NI = (GS,Oi, L) where:
– GS corresponds to the sets of global states in IS.
– L is a labelling function L : S → 2AP from global states to truth values,
where AP is a set of atomic propositions. This function assign truth values
to the primitive propositions AP at each global state in GS.
– Oi where i = (1, . . . , n) is a set of agents, gives a serial accessibility relation
on global states. Thus, we have that (le, l1, . . . , ln) Oi (l′e, l′1, . . . , l′n) if l′i ∈
GSi. If g = (le, l1, . . . , ln), g′ = (l′e, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n), and li Oi l′i, then we say that
g and g′ are Oi-accessible to agent i. The formula Oiφ is defined to be true
at g exactly if φ is true at all the global states are Oi-accessible from g.
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Definition 11 (NLTLI semantics).
The semantics of NLTLI is inductively defined as follows:
(IS, r,m) |= φ iff L(r,m)(φ) = true
(IS, r,m) |= φ ∧ ψ iff (IS, r,m) |= φ and (IS, r,m) |= ψ
(IS, r,m) |= ¬φ iff it is not the case that (IS, r,m) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Oiφ iff ∀(r′,m′) such that (r,m) Oi (r′,m′), then (IS, r′,m′) |=
φ
(IS, r,m) |= Xφ iff (IS, r,m+ 1) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Fφ iff for some time m′ ≥ m (IS, r,m′) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= Gφ iff for all time m′ ≥ m (IS, r,m′) |= φ
(IS, r,m) |= φUψ iff there is some time m′ ≥ m such that along the run such
that (IS, r,m′) |= ψ and for each m ≤ m′′ < m′ we have (IS, r,m′′) |= φ.
In the interpretation for obligations proposed here, this motivational attitude
is ascribed to the agents by an external reasoner. Two points (r,m) and (r′,m′)
are Oi-related if (r′m′) makes possible that agent i functions correctly at the
point (r,m). The notions of violation, right and sanction are defined as non
primitives.
First, we extend the language ofNLTLI to include the propositional constant
V as an abbreviation of the formula defined below. The meaning of the expression
V (φ) states that if φ holds at some point (r,m) then φ is considered to be a
violation.
Definition 12 (Violation).
From each literal built from a variable φ, V (¬φ) means that ¬φ is a violation
at some point (r,m) in the system for some ns ∈ NS, such that NS is a set of
norms, iff
Oi(φ U ψ)→ (¬φ U ψ)
If the system is at a point in which φ holds if agent i acts correctly until ψ
holds, then ¬φ holds until ψ holds. Agent i not working correctly means that
φ does not hold and that constitutes a violation in our system. The notion of
violation is of course inspired by the work of Anderson [50].
Some authors argued that undesirable states-of-affairs do not always follow
infractions, and that not all violations are sanctioned. In any case, we understand
the constant V as denoting a state in which some norm is violated.
Note that we have added a new element to our framework, namely, that of
the normative system ns ∈ NS that can be seen as either a a norm of the system
or as a normative agent, depending on the situation. Furthermore, we model ns
as the environment’s local state ge in NLTLI . Thus, the environment’s local
state of the system will act as a normative system that assigns agents’ rights,
obligations and permissions, and that it is in charge of sanctioning agents when
the violate a norm. We will see that our framework allows us to model the ns
as an agent in charge making agents abide by the norms quite naturally.
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We can imagine a context in which if an agent i is functioning correctly then
it will send an accept message as a response to a request when some agreement
preconditions hold. Conversely, if agent i does not accept the request it violates
the conversation norm that specified the correct functioning of that agent (i.e.,
its obligations).
In some cases, it may be interesting to specify agents’ behaviour by ruling
that performing some action at some point does not constitute a violation. We
use the notion of right to express this kind of norms. Thus, by using rights
we specify agents’ freedom to act in some specific way without that violating
a norm. In this sense, rights are considered here exceptions to obligations. An
agent has the right to bring about φ under some condition ψ if bringing about
φ is not a violation (¬V (φ)). From an external point of view, we say that “there
is a point in the system where agent i is functioning rightly if the holding of φ
does not constitute a violation”. We formalize this concept as follows:
Definition 13 (Right).
Let NS be a set of norms (ns1, . . . , nsn) encoded in the environment’s local
state ge, and let the variables of agent Ag contain a set of violation variables
V (φ) such that φ ∈ AP . Agent i’s functioning is right when φ holds, Riφ, for
some ns ∈ NS at some global state r(m), r(m) ∈ GS iff
¬V φ Uψ
Therefore, having the right to bring about φ under some precondition ψ
means that until ψ holds along a run, then φ not being a violation also holds
along that run. Rights are not only permissions. When an agent is exercising a
right, its freedom is specified in relation to that right.
From a linguistic point of view, we can understand right-based rules as de-
faults; if law changes and an exception to a right is made, then from that point
onwards exercising that particular right is considered a violation. The linguistic
interpretation is that if by default an agent has the right to agree or refuse to
a request, then there can be a new policy that overrules the default and states
that from now on exercising the right to refuse to a request sent by some agent-
manager is a violation of the agent-manager’s rights.
So, what happens when an agent not functioning correctly or rightly brings
about some φ, which constitutes a violation? We stated that in these cases,
there is an agent ns, called the normative agent, that, if working correctly,
will sanction the offending agent. The specific nature of the sanction varies from
system to system, and within the same system, from one scenario to another. The
general pattern, however, is that the sanctioned agent will have the obligation
to do something as a punishment for its violation. For example, agent i wants
to participate in a bidding process to buy a property on behalf of some estate
agents. Say that to enter the auction, you need to pay some deposit of 1,000 in
advance. If the agent (its role is bidder, bidder ∈ RN) wins the auction with an
agreed price of 200,000 for the property but decides to break the agreement by
withdrawing the bid then it is sanctioned by having the obligation to pay a fine
(given that “it is not functioning correctly”, that is, following the constitutive
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rules that define the protocol). The fine can be the 1,000 deposit paid to enter
the auction. We can formalize this notion of sanction as follows:
Definition 14 (Sanction).
Let b denote the role of bidder such that b ∈ RN , then a agent i such that
i ∈ Ag playing the role of bidder b has the obligation to pay a fine (by bringing
about φ) iff
bi ∧ (Oiφ U ψ) ∧ (¬Fφ U ψ)→ Oiω
Thus, if the system is at a point in which if an agent playing the role b
(bidder) is acting correctly, φ holds until ψ holds and φ does not eventually
happens while ψ, then i is sanctioned with the obligation of paying some fine ω.
This notion of sanction presented here can be greatly complicated by consid-
ering more complex behaviour to detect and sanction violations. However, for
our purposes the relatively minimal normative structure defined in this section is
sufficient to formulate a normative pragmatics for agent communication. In any
case, the normative specification of multi-agent systems is a difficult problem in
its own, and it exceeds the purposes of this paper.
7.4 NLTLI Axiomatics
Studying the complexity of the specification language NLTLI is interesting be-
cause we do not want that protocols defined using NLTLI that are too compu-
tationally hard.
It is well-known that the system KDn that characterizes Standard Deontic
Logic is sound and complete. In this section we give a complete and sound
axiomatization of NLTLI which consists of the axioms for obligations and the
linear temporal component. The following axioms provide a sound and complete
axiomatization of NLTLI :
PC All tautologies of propositional logic.
T1 X(φ→ ψ)→ (Xφ→ Xψ).
T2 X(¬φ) ≡ ¬Xφ.
T3 φ U ψ ≡ ψ ∨ (φ ∧X(φ U ψ).
RT1 From φ infer Xφ.
RT2 From φ′ → ¬ψ ∧Xφ′ infer φ′ → ¬(φ U ψ).
MP From φ and φ→ ψ infer ψ.
The axiomatics for the deontic operator is as follows. i denotes a set of agents
such that i = 1, . . . , n.
PC All instances of propositional tautologies.
MP If φ and φ→ ψ, then ψ.
NEC If φ, then Oiφ.
K Oi(φ→ ψ)→ (Oiφ→ Oiψ).
D Oiφ→ ¬Oi¬φ.
Theorem 2. The system NLTLI −Ax is a sound and complete axiomatization
with respect to the class of models NLTLI that are serial.
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The proof of the axiomatics of NLTLI can follow the same technique as that
of MLTLI (for a proof of linear temporal logics with an S5 axiomatics for a
knowledge operator see [38]).
We had various motivations to define this logic: First, given that NLTLI is
going to define the semantics of the normative operators used in the conversa-
tion norms, a deontic component was needed. We have introduced an standard
operator for obligation which was then used to define several other normative
concepts. Among them, the notion of right. Second, the semantics of NLTLI
are grounded upon interpreted systems. Finally, the temporal operators provide
useful tools to analyze how agents’ rights and obligations change over time. This
also means that coordinating communication through norms allows us to focus
on the external behaviour of agents, instead of modelling their mental reasoning
to interpret messages.
Next section presents the interaction protocols and conversation policies that
form the ACL normative pragmatics. The set of normative operators defined by
NLTLI are used in the conversation norms defined in the following sections.
8 Conversation Norms
NLTLI as a specification language provides a formal, unambiguous, and grounded
meaning for the key normative concepts to be used in the specification of norms
of conversation. A normative point of view to agent communication can be sum-
marized by the following points:
– Agent conversations often occur within an institution. In fact, there are
specific speech acts such as declare that are pure institutional facts. When the
appropriate role uses the adequate speech act within an institution, the agent
has performed an action by sending that message. The rules defining the
institution are constitutive rules specified by means of interaction protocols.
– Constitutive rules specify protocols such as English Auction, whereas regu-
lative rules are concerned with more context-dependent aspects in the form
of conversation policies. Both constitutive and regulative rules are declara-
tive and their aim is to stabilize communication by contextually constraining
agents’ communicative behaviour.
– Agents play roles, and their roles influence their communicative behaviour
thereby facilitating the achievement of the Rational Effects.
– Right is a normative notion that rules agents’ communicative behaviour by
specifying their freedom instead using pure restrictions and/or obligations.
Furthermore, definitions of violation and sanction are provided.
The protocols and policies that conform the norms of conversation must be
declarative so that they specify what agents can achieve using the rules instead
of how to achieve a particular result. In our view, formal logic constitutes a
more appropriate tool reason about multi-agent systems than procedural pro-
gramming languages or ontology-based languages like OWL [16]. Besides, there
are a number of verification techniques for logic-based specification languages
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[40] of systems that can be put to good use for the the verification of agent
communication languages.
When considering which language used for the specification of the speech acts
library, we conclude that although the semantics of the cognitive and temporal
operators were defined by MLTLI , the syntax of messages was going to follow
the FIPA specification. We gave two reasons for this decision: First, most of
the criticisms have been addressed to its semantics. Second, we are interested in
contributing to the standardization effort of agent communication led by FIPA,
so we focused on solving some of the problems of semantics of FIPA CAL.
However, we cannot use the same strategy and use UML diagrams for specify-
ing interaction protocols and conversation policies because they merely represent
the order in which messages can be uttered. This paper claims that ACL prag-
matics have been largely underdeveloped and it proposes a way of providing
expressive and high-level normative pragmatics.
8.1 Representation
Leaving aside the procedural and diagram-based approaches already discussed,
there is a recent trend in the specification of interaction protocols based on
propositional linear temporal logic (PLTL) [51] and finite-state machines [52].
Endriss [51] proposes to specify the class of all sequences of messages that are
allowed by a given protocol. He uses propositional LTL (PLTL) to specify the
protocols and model-checking techniques to verify the runtime conformance of
conversations to the protocol. Conversation templates are defined as sequences of
dialogue moves (speech acts). Those dialogues that can be captured by protocols
based on finite-state machines are legal according to a protocol if and only if they
are accepted by the finite-state machines that correspond to the protocols.
Standard finite-state protocols and PLTL are not suitable to interactions
involving commitments, social expectations and, in our case, rights and obliga-
tions. For example, we are interested in attributing to the (role of) auctioneer
the obligation to close the auction at some point, and to give the bidder the
right to bid after the auctioneer declares the auction open. In other words, we
need to consider how the system evolves as a result of agents’ performing actions
(speech acts in our case). It is convenient that the execution of speech acts be
ruled by some protocols and policies if we want communication to be efficient.
8.2 Normative Protocols and Policies
Thus, for the formulation of a high-level norms of conversation, we need to
consider taking into account the following elements:
1. A set of atomic propositions P to describe facts. They usually consist of
propositional content of messages.
2. A set of agents that participate in the conversation.
3. A set of speech acts (query, request, etc.) that convey the illocutionary
and perlocutionary acts of performing a communicative action.
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4. A set of normative rules of the form npi(sa(i, j, P )) which consist of a
normative predicate (right, obligation), the action (a speech act) and the
content of the speech act φ.
5. A set of broadcasting actions. Broadcasting actions denoting events state
that a speech act sa is sent, received, answered or not-answered. This aspect
refers to the history of the conversation.
6. A set of roles taken by the agents involved in the interaction. Roles are
specified as facts about individual agents rolei.
7. An agent performing the role of normative system ns encoded in the
environment’s local state of the system. ns has the obligation of monitoring
the conversations to detect violations, apply sanctions and making sure that
messages are delivered.
In NLTLI , we formalized obligations, rights and permissions as entirely de-
pendent on agents’ local states. Thus, any communicative actions they take are a
function of their local state. Their local states also contain information regarding
their initial state in the execution and the history of messages sent and receive
(i.e., its conversational record; we build on the knowledge-based interpreted sys-
tem model [28] to model the history of conversation).
Definition 15 (History).
Let us consider an agent i such that i ∈ Ag, a set of broadcasting actions
BE, a set of speech acts SA, a set of initial states S0i for agent i, and a set of
contextual actions DOi for i. A history for agent i is a sequence where
1. The first element is in S0i,
2. the later elements consist of nonempty sets of broadcasting actions such as
senti(sa(i, j, P )), receivei(sa(i, j, P )), or do(i, α) such that α ∈ DOi.
The history of conversation of an agent i at some point (r,m) of the system
is composed by its initial state and the sequence of steps corresponding to i’s
actions up to timem. We can also say that if an agent i at a point (r,m) has only
sent an agree speech act to agent j, senti(agree(i, j, P )), then its history at point
(r,m) is the result of appending the set {sent(i, j, agree(P ))}. Furthermore, a
broadcasting event occurs in round m + 2 of run r if it is contained in some
agent’s history of conversation in (r,m+ 2).
We have mentioned above that our framework models the system environ-
ment as a normative agent ns whose task is to decide when performing a speech
act is a violation and the sanctioning it when appropriate. In order to take these
decisions the environment’s local state must record the events that take place
in the system, namely, the speech acts performed by the agents involved in a
conversation. Furthermore, it need to keep an up to date record of the evolution
of agents’ rights, obligations and permissions according to the actions they have
performed so far, taking into account the fact that performing speech acts’ cause
social expectations. Note, however, that determining and reasoning about the
actions that ns can perform is part of the social structure of the system. There-
fore, the ACL specification does not account for the acquisition of knowledge or
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beliefs by ns nor the reasoning employed to sanction violations. Doing so is not
within the purposes of this paper.
Thus, we need to consider both agents’ and the environment’s actions to
explain how their actions cause the system to change state: (αe, α1, . . . , αn) and
a transition function that maps global states to global states: δ(αe, α1, . . . , αn).
We can now define a protocol as a mapping from the set Li of agent i’s local
states to nonempty sets of acts in BEi. Furthermore, a protocol Pe for the
normative agent ns is a mapping from the set of the environment’s local states
Le to nonempty sets of actions in DOe.
We include normative concepts and propositional variables in our protocol
rules. Furthermore, these rules must be declarative, that is, they say what the
rights and permissions of the agents are, rather than a procedure to move from
to one state to another. This secures the high-level character of our ACL. In-
teraction protocols are defined in NPRAG using if-then rules as the constitutive
rules that specify the legal interactions of conversations. If agent j receives a
request then agent j has the right to answer either by agreeing or by refusing.
We elaborate on these points in order to give specify some of the FIPA
interaction protocols.
8.3 Request
Typically, protocols are described by means of programs written in some pro-
gramming language. For clarity of exposition we will use in this paper NLTLI
extended with parameters for agents, roles and actions. Having extended the
Interpreted Systems model to express normative notions for their use in agent
communication languages, we could have employed a similar strategy and adapt
a simple programming language defined within the interpreted systems model
[28] to express protocols that include agents’ roles, rights, obligations, speech
acts and broadcasting actions. After showing in this section how our approach
can be used to specify an ACL pragmatics using norms, we will offer an example
of a protocol using a simple programming language.
Let us consider again the FIPA Request interaction protocol. This protocol
allows one agent to request to bring about some propositional content φ. If the
receiver of the request speech act is functioning rightly, then it will send an agree
or a refuse as a response to the request. If the answer is an agree, and the agent
is functioning correctly at that point, then it will communicate an inform if
the request is satisfied, or a failure if the object of the request is not achieved.
The specification of this protocol in NPRAG looks is composed by the following
norms of conversation:
1. principali ∧ secretaryj → Ri(request(i, j, φ))
2. receivej(request(i, j, φ)) ∧ ¬sentj(refuse(j, i, φ))→ Rj(refuse(j, i, φ))
3. receivej(request(i, j, φ)) ∧ ¬sentj(agree(j, i, φ))→ Rj(agree(j, i, φ))
4. sentj(agree(j, i, φ)) ∧ Fφ→ Oj(inform(j, i, φ))
5. sentj(agree(j, i, φ)) ∧ ¬Fφ→ Oj(failure(j, i, φ))
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Note that the proposition of the normative predicates for rights, obligations
and permissions are taken as expressing a communicative action like “agent i
agrees with agent j to bring about some φ”.
In the Request specification there are two agents i and j that take the roles
of secretary and principal respectively. As a propositional content of the speech
acts, we can think of a situation in which agent principal has the right to request
to agent secretary to book a number of flights.
The rules state that the principal has the right to send any request message
to the secretary, and that the secretary can answer to these messages either by
agreeing or refusing if an answer has not been produced yet. The two obligation
rules state that an agent has the obligation to send an inform having already
sent an agree message and not having sent yet inform that the request has been
satisfied.
As it is, the reasoning rules presented above capture the transitions that a
system functioning rightly can perform under the NPRAG Request interaction
protocol. However, we need something else, that is, to instantiate some of the
facts of the NPRAG specification of request. In particular, we need to say which
messages have been sent or are still pending. As discussed above, the history of
conversation is part of agents’ local state, whereas the status of messages and
agents’ rights and obligations are encoded in the environment’s local state. None
of these components are part of the interaction protocol specification. Indeed,
for the sake of generality, it is desirable that our protocols only provide a set of
norms of conversation to facilitate agents’ next move in absence of any specific
circumstances.
8.4 Query-If
In the FIPA Query-IF interaction protocol, an agent i queries agent j whether or
not a proposition φ is true. The receiver has the right to either agree or refuse to
send and inform message providing an answer. In the case that agent j agrees,
then it has obligation to send a notification which can be an inform stating the
truth of falsehood of the proposition φ. If agent j sends a refuse message the
protocol ends there. We only show the relevant normative rules of this protocol:
1. journalisti ∧ policitianj → Ri(queryif(i, j, φ))
2. receivej(queryif(i, j, φ)) ∧ ¬sentj(refuse(j, i, φ))→ Rj(refuse(j, i, φ))
3. receivej(queryif(i, j, φ)) ∧ ¬sentj(agree(j, i, φ))→ Rj(agree(j, i, φ))
4. sentj(agree(j, i, φ)) ∧ Fφ→ Oj(inform(j, i, φ))
5. sentj(agree(j, i, φ)) ∧ ¬Fφ→ Oj(failure(j, i, φ))
We can see that its structure is almost equivalent to the Request protocol;
only the use of queryif instead of request is different. This means that our pro-
posal is high-level enough so that it is easily adaptable to represent different
interaction protocols and different contexts. Only the content of the messages
and the roles of the agents may change.
The specification of the constitutive rules of conversations enable us to for-
mulate a number of policies that contextually contrain agents’ communicative
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behaviour within the protocol in terms of their rights, obligations and permis-
sions.
8.5 Conversation Policies
Since conversation policies usually restrict agents’ behaviour within conversa-
tions, the notation of the pragmatic regulative rules that conform NPRAG con-
versation policies consists of the components used in the specification of inter-
action protocols. Moreover, we would like to stress the importance of one of the
elements and propose a new one:
– A set of contextual actions DOi that depend on specific scenarios, e.g.,
the action of bidding depends on the agent being in an auction.
– A conflict resolution action so that in case of conflict between rules of a
policy, one rule has priority over another one.
Constructs such as the conflict resolution actions, the contextual and broad-
casting actions depend on the platform in which agents run. That is, these ac-
tions are defined by the programming language in which agents are built. For
example, in Java built platforms like JADE, sending messages is simply a case
of creating an ACLMessage, setting the parameters (sender, receiver, reply-to,
performative, etc.) and then sending it using the send() method in the agent
object.
If the normative rules in the interaction protocols specify the legal structure
of the conversation, conversation policies regulate agents’ behaviour according
to contextual information within the protocol. Roles and background knowledge
provide valuable information for agents to choose the right course of action.
Unlike the specification of the interaction protocols, we consider the content of
the speech acts when proposing normative rules. Furthermore, note that the
policies are tightly combined with the ACL semantics defined in the previous
chapter. Thus, the meaning of a speech act such as queryif is enriched by the
rights, obligations and permissions of agents to use that particular speech act.
We can imagine a situation in which an agent paxman has the right to queryif
a politician agent pm about the truth of the “peersmoney” scandal as long as
we are not in electoral campaign.
paxmani ∧ pmj → Ri(queryif(i, j(peersmoney))U¬(elections)
Another example can be of an agent j acting on behalf of an airline company
serving flights to European countries, that could have a policy that states that it
should agree to every request regarding flight tickets to Europe (i.e., answering
about flight times and providing the best offer for a potential buyer) and another
one specifying that it has the obligation to refuse every request about flights to
non European countries.
– customeri∧sellerj∧receivej(request(i, j, europeanF light))→ Oj(agree(j, i, φ)).
– receivej(request(i, j, nonEuropeanF light))→ Oj(refuse(j, i, φ)).
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This issue shows how using normative conversation policies help agents to
achieve the perlocutionary effects since the perlocution of agree, namely, that
the receiver satisfies the object of the requested action, is now specified to be
an obligation of the seller. This is a crucial point to help agents to achieve the
rational effects of an speech act. For example, we can specify a rule to state that
if an agent makes a promise to increase the taxes on air planes fuel, then it has
the obligation to do so:
G(sendi(promise(i, public, taxairplanesFuel))→
Oi(increaseTaxes(airplanesFuel))
The extension of our approach to other protocols and policies in the FIPA
specification is fairly straightforward. Our approach shows how a well-defined
normative concepts can be used to propose a high-level ACL pragmatics that
are declarative, takes into account the context and that helps agents to achieve
the perlocutionary effects of the speech acts. These two properties of the norma-
tive pragmatics, contextual and perlocutionary, fill in the last gaps in the list of
requirements for ACLs discussed in section 1 and table 1. Next section offers a
comparison to other approaches and discusses some short term future work nec-
essary to improve the ongoing work presented in this paper. As a final note, the
simplicity of the protocols and policies specified in this section was intentional.
An important point for any future application of agent communication languages
remains the proposal of high-level but simple ACL semantics and pragmatics.
8.6 Programs
Fagin et al. introduce a simple programming language which can be easily re-
lated to an Interpreted System [28]. Although the language is designed to express
agents’ knowledge, it can be adapted for its use in specifying norms of conversa-
tion. The basic standard program for agent i consists of statement of the form
case of
if t1 ∧ k1 do a1
if t2 ∧ k2 do a2
end case
where the ti’s are tests about some facts, ki are knowledge test for agent
i and ai denote agent i’s actions. We modify these knowledge-based programs
to express tests over obligations, rights and permissions of agents, namely, to
normative-based programs. The normative component consists of a Boolean
combination of the form Oiϕ where ϕ can be an arbitrary formula that may
include other deontic and temporal operators. Using this simple language we
can express high-level protocols for agent communication. We represent the Fipa
Request protocol specified above in table 9.
At first glance, it may seem a bit odd to use obligations after the operator do.
However, in the interpretation of obligations and rigths provided byNLTLI ,Oiϕ
means that “ϕ holds in agent i is working correctly” whereas Riϕ is interpreted
as “ϕ holds at some point of the system (r,m) if agent i is acting rightly”.
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case of
if (principali ∧ secretaryj) ∧Ri(request(i, j, φ)) do sendi(request(, j, φ))
if receivej(request(i, j, φ)) ∧Rj(refuse(j, i, φ)) do sentj(refuse(j, i, φ))
if receivej(request(i, j, φ)) ∧Rj(agree(j, i, φ)) do sentj(agree(j, i, φ))
if sentj(agree(j, i, φ)) ∧ Fφ do Oj(inform(j, i, φ))
if sentj(agree(j, i, φ)) ∧ ¬Fφ do Oj(failure(j, i, φ))
end case
Table 9. Program for Request Protocol.
Therefore, the last statement of the program denotes that if agent j has agreed
to bring about some φ to agent j and φ does not eventually happens in the run
of the system then agent j does send a failure message to agent i if working
correctly.
9 Concluding Remarks
The characterization of roles is inspired by the work done on organizational
concepts [53,45]. Other authors [18], have also presented temporal deontic logic
with dynamic operators, but the combination of deontic, dynamic and temporal
notions results in a logic that is too complex for our purposes.
In a very recent paper Boella et al. [54] present a role-based approach to ACL
semantics. They intend to make the ACL semantics public by attributing mental
states to social roles instead of agents. Thus, there are two sets of beliefs, those
that are public and are ascribed to roles, and those that are private and belong
to the agents’ private mental states. A role is constrained by a set of social rules
(rights, obligations, permissions, etc.) that define the expected behaviour of any
agent playing the role. These social rules may or may not conflict the private
beliefs and goals of agents. In any case, even if beliefs and goals are attributed
to roles, agents playing a role would still need to reason about their beliefs and
goals. From a semantic point of view, defining the ACL semantics in terms of
roles makes the semantics less general, since the meaning of speech acts would
be affected by agents’ role. For example, two roles that are considered are those
of speaker and receiver.
We believe that this paper offers a new framework for agent communication
where the meaning of speech acts consists of the combination of the semantic
specification and the NPRAG rules that constrain their use.
First, it clearly distinguishes semantics and pragmatics of the language. Se-
mantically, it offers a computationally grounded specification language based
on MLTLI . This enables to define meaningful and public communicative ac-
tions. Regarding the pragmatics, it presents a procedure using normative rules
to guide agents in conversation. Unlike research in ACL semantics, there are not
many works that attempt to capture both aspects of communication in the same
framework.
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Considering the list of requirements for ACLs discussed, the approach pre-
sented in this paper achieves a number of objectives. After the semantics of
the language was specified, the aim was to produce a pragmatic theory that
would consider how contextual information constrains agents’ behaviour, and
how proposing normative rules for the use of speech acts facilitate the achieve-
ment of the perlocutionary effects.
1. Autonomous: The ACL semantics (SAL) do not completely fix agents com-
municative behaviour because the fulfilment of the perlocutionary effects are
left to the ACL pragmatics.
2. Complete: We have defined a complete set of speech acts, understanding
“complete” as representing every category in Searle’s taxonomy. Searle’s
taxonomy is by no means a closed list; one could imagine a more fine-grained
taxonomy including more systematic distinctions between types of directives
such as yes/no questions, prohibitives, etc. However, this paper completes
FIPA specification by defining speech acts for commissives and declaratives.
3. Context: In agent communication contextual factors include the role that
agents play in the application scenario, the delegated tasks agents try to
achieve, the propositional content of messages, and the record of previous
exchanges. The use of normative concepts to model ACL pragmatics keep to
a minimum agents’ reasoning about each others’ mental states. In that sense,
it is more efficient. Furthermore, by avoiding that reasoning, the specification
of conversation protocols and policies is greatly simplified.
4. Declarative: By providing a declarative definition of ACL semantics and
pragmatics, specifying what the meaning is instead of a follow-the-rule low-
level procedure, the resultant unified ACL is a high-level language.
5. Formal: The unified ACL is specified using two formal logics, MLTLI and
NLTLI that describe the evolution of a multi-agent systems with respect to
the agents’ beliefs, goals, intentions, obligations and rights. A particular care
was to provide an external interpretation of beliefs, goals and intentions in
a way that those attitudes would refer states of a system instead of private
mental states of the agents. In doing so, we were paving the ground provide
a semantics and pragmatics suitable for verification.
6. Grounded: The notion of interpreted system was introduced [28] upon
which the two specification languages MLTLI NLTLI were grounded.
7. Public: We claim that the illocutive/intentional aspect of communication
should be preserved in the ACL semantics. This paper proposes an external
interpretation of motivational concepts by relating them to states of agents
in a system.
8. Perlocutionary: Conversation norms in the form of protocols and policies
enable agents to achieve the perlocutionary effects by specifying obligations
and rights on the participants. In order to preserve agents’ autonomy, we
offer a notion of right which specifies agents’ behaviour when acting rightly.
It should be made clear that complying with these requirements is not the
end of the story but rather its beginning. In other words, we see these properties
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as the starting point for the development of agent communication languages.
A number of problems are still to be solved including issues of verification,
implementation and the interaction of the communicative module with the rest
of the social structure of the system.
Further work includes providing proofs for some properties of the interaction
protocols with respect to interpreted systems. Furthermore, it would be interest-
ing to provide a detail proof of the soundness and completeness of MLTLI and
NLTLI . We also need to verify the semantics of NLTLI in various ways. There
are various methods of verification which depend on the type of ACL, on the
information available, and on whether we are interested in verifying the ACL at
design time or at run time [7]. Unlike other approaches, we are particularly in-
terested in verifying the ACL pragmatics (only) because the pragmatics encodes
the general communicative behaviour of agents. Following this, the type of the
ACL to be verified corresponds, in our approach, to the normative component.
Current work on pre-runtime verification of complex formal logics [55,56] looks
very promising. Furthermore, it would be interesting to produce more sophisti-
cated implementations of conversation protocols and policies in a manner that
they could be integrated with platforms such as 3APL and BOID [57,45].
Deontic concepts are increasingly used in the specification and verification of
multi-agent systems. It is unrealistic to assume that a whole open multi-agent
system may be controlled by the same vendor. Thus, this makes it difficult to
verify agents’ conformance with the set of semantic and pragmatic specifications
of ACLs. In this sense, by adopting a normative point of view, it seems more
sensible to leave open the theoretical possibility of agents violating the norms.
We can then use the formal language provided to reason about the consequences
that result from those violations. Separating the specification language (from
the implementation language) allows us to reason about external properties of
the system. Further work on these issues would include the definition of more
normative notions to complement right which may be more suitable to specific
circumstances, and to embed our ACL in a normative multi-agent system.
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